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components of carbon leakage – market leakage and emissions savings – are counteracting: 
carbon leakage increases with market leakage but decreases with emissions savings. We also 
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domestic leakage can be negative with a mandate. The IPCC definition of leakage omits 
domestic leakage, resulting in biased estimates. Leakage with a tax credit always exceeds that 
of a mandate, while the combination of a mandate and tax credit generates lower leakage than 
a tax credit alone. In general, a gallon of ethanol (energy equivalent) is found to replace 35 
percent of a gallon of gasoline – not 100 percent as assumed by life-cycle accounting. This 
means ethanol emits 13 percent more carbon than a gallon of gasoline if indirect land use 
change (iLUC) is not included in the estimated emissions savings effect and 43 percent more 
when iLUC is included.  
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The Implications of Alternative Biofuel Policies on Carbon Leakage  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The issue of carbon leakage – where greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions by an 
environmental policy are partially or more than offset because of market effects – is often 
raised as an issue that will undermine environmental policies.  Leakage has been extensively 
studied in the case of indirect land use change (iLUC) generated from biofuels policies (e.g., 
Searchinger et al. 2008).
1 The controversy over iLUC has been whether or not biofuels fulfill 
a sustainability threshold (e.g., a 20 percent reduction in carbon emissions for U.S. corn-
ethanol relative to gasoline it is assumed to replace). However, leakage has also been a 
criterion to determine the eligibility of biofuels for carbon offsets in the Clean Development 
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. 
What has not been studied to date is the indirect output use change (iOUC) in the fuel 
market itself where the addition of biofuels always causes a reduction in world gasoline 
market prices.
2 This paper develops a formal analytical framework to analyze the carbon 
leakage due to alternative biofuel policies, namely biofuel consumption subsidies (like the 
U.S. blender’s tax credit or a fuel tax exemption at the retail pump in many other countries) 
and mandates, and the combination of a subsidy and a mandate. We identify two components 
of carbon leakage: the “market leakage effect” and the “emissions savings effect”. The 
former refers to the resulting market effect of biofuels in displacing gasoline and other oil 
consumption
3 while the latter is the relative carbon emissions of biofuels versus gasoline.  
We distinguish “domestic” versus “international” leakage. This differs from the 
methodology used by the IPCC, where domestic leakage is implicitly netted out. Because 
world gasoline prices decline with either biofuel policy, international leakage is always 
positive, as is domestic leakage with a tax credit. But domestic leakage with a mandate can be 
negative under some market conditions, making it possible that total (domestic plus 
international) leakage can be negative. For plausible parameter values we, however, find that, 
in reality, this is not the case as international leakage is much bigger than domestic leakage.  
Nevertheless, the level of market leakage for either policy depends on two key market 
parameters: (a) the elasticities of gasoline supply curves and fuel demand curves; and (b) 
consumption and production shares of the country introducing the biofuels. But leakage is 
found empirically to be more sensitive to elasticities than to market shares, and especially to 
changes in market parameters of the country not introducing biofuels. 
Domestic leakage becomes more important relative to international leakage as the 
Home country consumes more gasoline and/or the relative demand elasticity of the Home 
country increases. Our empirical results show that domestic leakage is less important for total 
market leakage compared to the case of carbon leakage – a result driven by the emissions 
savings effect. Therefore, were the IPCC methodology applied to the issue addressed in this 
paper, the estimates of carbon leakage would be biased.  
The economics of a consumption mandate is shown to be more complex than that of a 
tax credit because the former generates a U-shaped fuel supply curve. However, for the same 
                                                 
1 There are numerous studies on iLUC. See Al-Riffai, et al. (2010) for a survey. 
2 The term “indirect output use change” (iOUC) was coined by de Gorter and Just (2009b) to emphasize how 
arbitrary the emphasis on iLUC was while not analyzing iOUC.  
3 Life-cycle accounting that underpins the 0,1 sustainability thresholds, like the U.S. requirement that corn-
ethanol reduce GHG emissions by 20 percent relative to gasoline, assumes one gallon of ethanol (gasoline 
equivalent) replaces one gallon of gasoline.  
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amount of ethanol, market leakage due to a tax credit is always greater than that due to a 
binding consumption mandate. We also find that the combination of a binding consumption 
mandate and a tax credit produces greater leakage than with a mandate alone. If in 
combination with a mandate, the leakage due to the tax credit alone is infinite. 
For a range of plausible elasticities and 2009 U.S. market shares, we find market 
leakage to be in the order of 60 to 65 percent for all three policy options (a tax credit, a 
mandate, and their combination), i.e., one (gasoline-equivalent) gallon of ethanol replaces 
only 0.35 to 0.40 gallons of gasoline and the rest (0.60 and 0.65 gallons, respectively) is 
displaced. This combined with the effect of iLUC makes one gallon of ethanol emit 1.43 
times more carbon than one gallon of gasoline. Note that the EPA in its evaluation of iLUC 
using life-cycle accounting assumes a one-to-one replacement of gasoline with ethanol. On 
the other hand, the magnitude of carbon leakage is lower when iLUC is not taken into 
account, 20 to 25 percent, (because the emissions savings effect is strong) but significantly 
higher, 190 to 210 percent, when the effect of iLUC is considered that weakens the emissions 
savings effect. Carbon leakage due to iLUC is therefore not as important as that due to iOUC.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section defines leakage 
and explains two components of carbon leakage – market leakage and emissions savings. In 
Section 3, we analyze market leakage due to a blender’s tax credit. The discussion includes 
implications for how country size on world oil markets affects leakage. In Section 4, we 
investigate market leakage under a binding consumption mandate and discuss the leakage 
effects of adding a blender’s tax credit to the mandate. Numerical estimates of leakage are 
provided in Section 5. The last section provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Market and Carbon Leakage Defined 
 
Whenever a ‘clean’ biofuel is subsidized or mandated relative to a ‘dirty’ source like 
gasoline, carbon leakage occurs - the actual carbon savings may be more or less than the 
intended savings (from biofuel consumption). Carbon leakage is a result of two, typically, 
counteracting effects: the “emissions savings” effect and the “market leakage” effect in the 
fuel market.
4 To define the former, denote carbon emissions per unit of energy from a dirty 
(e.g., gasoline) and clean (e.g., biofuel) source by ed and ec, respectively. Define the 
emissions savings effectξ to be the relative difference between ed and ec: 
( ) d c d e e e ξ = −  
The interpretation of ξ is straightforward. A value of  0.20 ξ = means that gasoline emits 20 
percent more carbon relative to the same amount (gasoline equivalent) of the biofuel. 
While the emissions savings effect depends solely on technical properties of the two 
fuel sources, the market leakage effect results from market forces in the fuel market after the 
introduction of biofuels. To show this, the initial world consumption of fuel from gasoline is: 
0 0 0 H F C C C = +  
where H and F denote Home and Foreign country, respectively. In the new equilibrium with 
E units of biofuels, world fuel consumption is given by: 
1 1 1 H F C E C C = + +  
Market leakage due to the introduction of E units of biofuels is the change in world 
fuel consumption (in absolute terms): 
1 0 1 1 0 0 H F H F H F C C C E C C C C E C C ∆ = − = + + − − = + ∆ + ∆  
                                                 
4 The two effects act in the same direction if market leakage is negative. 
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where  H C ∆ and  F C ∆ represent a change in consumption of gasoline in the Home and Foreign 
country, respectively. 
In relative terms, the market leakage effect is given by: 
( ) M H F L C E E C C E = ∆ = + ∆ + ∆  
For example, if LM = 0.7, then one unit of biofuel replaces 0.3 units of gasoline while total 
fuel use has increased by 0.7 units.  
The same logic of market leakage also applies to the formula for carbon leakage: 
divide the expected change in carbon emissions due to the introduction of a clean fuel by the 
intended reduction in carbon. The formulae for the market leakage and emissions savings 
effects can be combined to derive an expression for carbon leakage LC:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
C d d H F d L e E e C C e E C E E
C E E E C E
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
  = − + ∆ + ∆ = − + ∆ −  
= − + ∆ − = ∆ −
 
which can be rewritten into a simple and intuitive form:
5 
                                                   1 C M L L ξ = −                                                             (1) 
Equation (1) clearly identifies the two driving forces of carbon leakage: the emissions 
savings and the market leakage effects. Depending on the relative value of the emissions 
savings and market leakage effects, carbon leakage can be positive, zero, or even negative.  
It is the use of biofuels as a substitute for gasoline that gives rise to the many potential 
sizes and signs of carbon leakage. The magnitude of carbon leakage also depends critically 
on the value of the emissions savings effect. For example, total carbon emissions could 
increase if coal were replaced with oil; but very likely decrease were the former replaced with 
natural gas. To illustrate the sensitivity of carbon leakage to the size of the emissions savings 
effect, we note that the direct emissions of corn-ethanol (as measured by life-cycle 
accounting) are 52 percent less than emissions from gasoline. (EPA 2010). In this case, the 
magnitude of market leakage is multiplied by two (i.e., 1/0.52, as per equation (1)). But if 
indirect land use change (iLUC) is taken into account, then corn-ethanol only saves 21 
percent relative to gasoline (RFA 2010). The magnitude of the market leakage is multiplied 
by five (1/0.21) in this case (as per equation (1)). 
The formula for carbon leakage given by equation (1) is also very general; it 
accommodates both autarky and international trade cases, allows for any type of policy that 
affects the introduction of biofuels on the market, and it requires some estimate of the 
emissions savings effectξ to determine the magnitude of carbon leakage. It also indicates that 
carbon leakage can only be positive if market leakage is positive. On the other hand, there 
can be situations when carbon leakage is negative even though market leakage is positive. 
This may happen when the market leakage is sufficiently small and/or a biofuel has 
substantially lower carbon emissions relative to gasoline. 
Implicitly embedded in equation (1) is the fact that the existence of market leakage 
undermines the emissions savings effect. Therefore, a question arises as to what the true 
emissions savings of ethanol compared to gasoline are when the two effects are combined. 
The induced carbon emissions of a gallon of ethanol that was introduced in the market are 
given by:  
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 d d H F M d e E e C C E L e ξ ξ   − + ∆ + ∆ = − +    
Therefore, the true emissions savings of ethanol versus gasoline are: 
( ) 1 d M d d M e L e e L ξ ξ   − − + = −    
                                                 
5 Here we assume no “technical leakage”, i.e., the emissions intensities of dirty energy source are the same in 
both countries. 
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  This result is very intuitive – in the presence of market leakage, emissions savings of 
ethanol relative to gasoline are lowered by the counteracting market leakage effect. An 
implication of the finding above is that if the market leakage effect is stronger than the 
emissions savings effect, then consumption of ethanol does not reduce global carbon 
emissions, but increases them.  
Although one would expect the value of the emissions savings effect to be more 
precise, including market effects with iLUC can make it as difficult to compute as the market 
leakage effect in the fuel market itself as both market leakage effects depend on uncertain 
market parameters such as supply and demand elasticities. The theoretical analysis to follow 
evaluates only market leakage in an international trade framework as carbon leakage can be 
readily calculated using equation (1).  
 
3.  Market Leakage with a Blender’s Tax Credit 
 
Consider a competitive gasoline market in Figure 1 where the Home country (H) is an 
importer and the Foreign country (F) an exporter of fuel. The initial fuel price Pw0 is where 
excess demand EDH equals excess supply ESF. Initial fuel consumption is CH0 and CF0 in the 
Home and Foreign country, respectively. Similarly, QH0 and QF0 denote Home and Foreign 
country’s production of gasoline.  
Suppose there is a consumption subsidy (a blender’s tax credit) for ethanol in the 
Home market that generates a positive level of E units of ethanol production along the 
ethanol supply curve (not shown). The tax credit-induced ethanol is an exogenous (taxpayer-
financed) increase in fuel supply and can be depicted as a shift in SH to SH' by the distance E 
in the first panel of Figure 1. As domestic supply of fuel increases, excess demand shifts 
down to EDH', creating a new world fuel price Pw1 that is less than Pw0. 
With an exogenous increase in fuel supply due to ethanol production, fuel prices 
decline and total fuel consumption increases. The latter is market leakage (displacement of 
gasoline) and hence, unlike that assumed with life-cycle analysis, a gallon of ethanol (in 
gasoline equivalent) replaces less than a gallon of gasoline. With international trade, there are 
two components of market (and also of carbon) leakage. The first is domestic leakage, 
represented by an increase in fuel consumption in the Home country (distance CH0CH1), while 
international leakage is defined as an increase in fuel consumption in the Foreign country 
(distance CF0CF1) (de Gorter 2009). With a blender’s tax credit, both leakages are always 
non-negative because each country faces the same decrease in the gasoline price. 
While Figure 1 depicts market leakage in its absolute form, an expression representing 
the market effect as a relative number makes it possible to identify its determinants, namely, 
supply and demand elasticities for gasoline and production and consumption shares in the 
gasoline markets in both countries. The formula for market leakage due to tax credit-induced 
production of ethanol in the Home country is given by (see Drabik, de Gorter and Just 2010): 
                                       ( )





DH DF SH SF
L
τ ρη ρ η
ρη ρ η φη φ η
+ −
≈
+ − − − −
                                 (2) 
whereτ denotes a blender’s tax credit,ρ stands for a share of the Home country in world 
gasoline consumption, φ denotes a share of the Home country in world gasoline  production; 
andηdenotes an elasticity. The first subscript D and S in each term signifies demand and 
supply, respectively and the second subscript (H and F) denotes country, e.g.,  DH η denotes the 
elasticity of fuel demand in the Home country. 
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4.  Market Leakage with a Consumption Mandate 
 
The economics of a biofuels consumption mandate is different from that of a tax credit. It is 
because unlike a tax credit, which is a taxpayer-financed subsidy on ethanol production, 
ethanol produced to meet the mandate is financed by a money transfer from oil producers and 
(under some circumstances) fuel consumers (de Gorter and Just 2008; Lapan and Moschini 
2009). With a consumption mandate, there are four distinct agents in the market: ethanol 
producers, gasoline producers, fuel blenders, and fuel consumers. We first explain the basic 
economics of a consumption mandate under autarky and then analyze leakage effects of this 
policy with international trade. For a more comprehensive treatment of the consumption 
mandate see de Gorter and Just (2008).  
Consider the first panel in Figure 2. If a consumption of E gallons of ethanol is 
mandated, the ethanol market price (PE) is read off the ethanol supply curve SE. The produced 
ethanol essentially shifts the gasoline supply curve ST horizontally to the right by the amount 
of E, represented by the curve ST'. The U-shaped fuel supply curve 
*
F S represents marginal 
costs for the blender (see de Gorter and Just 2008 for details on how
*
F S is derived).  
A blender equilibrates the marginal cost with the market price for fuel which is read 
off the demand curve DH. The intersection of DH with
*
F S constitutes a market equilibrium 
with a fuel price PF1 and fuel consumption of CH1. In the new equilibrium, less gasoline is 
demanded by blenders because a fixed amount of ethanol is mandated to be consumed. This 
results in a lower gasoline price received by gasoline producers PG1 and so gasoline 
production declines. Total fuel consumption can either decrease or increase, depending on the 
position of the fuel demand curve.
  
How is it possible that total fuel supply can go up? Think of a consumption mandate 
as a tax on the gasoline market. Gasoline consumers pay a higher price for gasoline (to pay 
for high ethanol price) and gasoline producers obtain a lower price. So the mandate is at once 
acting as a monopolist against gasoline consumers and a monopsonist against gasoline 
producers. It is possible that the revenues extracted from gasoline producers are so high 
(inelastic gasoline supply curve) that total fuel production (and hence consumption) goes up 
(fuel price goes down). Consumers still pay a higher price for gasoline but with ethanol 
supply, a lower fuel price. 
The economics of a consumption mandate with international trade is analogous to the 
autarky case above (with a slight change in notation). The Home country is assumed to be an 
importer.
6 Prior to the policy, fuel demand in the Home country faces total gasoline supply 
ST) given by the horizontal sum of domestic SH and Foreign excess supply curve of gasoline 
SF - DF. When a consumption mandate is imposed, the total gasoline supply in the Home 
country shifts to the right by the amount E (depicted by ST'). An intersection of the demand 
for fuel in Home country DH and the fuel supply, 
*
F S  defines the fuel price paid by fuel 
consumers in the Home country PF1. World fuel price is given by PG1. Since this is lower 
than the fuel price in the initial equilibrium, fuel consumption in the Foreign country goes up 
by CF0 CF1 (international leakage). Fuel consumption in the Home country can decrease (as 
shown in Figure 2), stay unchanged, or increase, depending on where DH intersects
*
F S . 
So depending on whether domestic fuel consumption decreases with a consumption 
mandate or not, total leakage may be negative provided that an increase in gasoline 
consumption in the Foreign country is more than offset by a reduction in domestic fuel 
                                                 
6 This parallels the U.S. case, as the United States is the world’s largest ethanol producer; is an oil importer and 
has a consumption mandate.  
 7 
 
consumption. We also note that even if domestic fuel prices go up with a mandate, GHG 
emissions can increase provided that total market leakage is positive and the emissions 
savings effect is sufficiently small. It can also be the case that even if the domestic fuel prices 
decline, global GHG emissions can decline as well, provided that the total market leakage is 
positive and the emissions savings effect is strong enough. Therefore, a reduction in the fuel 
price is not a sufficient condition for GHG emissions to increase. 
The analytical formula for market leakage with a consumption mandate  M L
σ derived in 
Drabik, de Gorter and Just (2010) takes the form: 
                            ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1
DH SH SF DH DF
M
SH SF DH DF
L
σ δ η φη φ η ρη ρ η
φη φ η ρη ρ η
− + − − − −
≈
+ − − − −
                          (4) 
where 0 E G P P δ = % is the ratio of the intercept of the ethanol supply curve and gasoline market 
price under no ethanol production. The structure of the equation (4) is very similar to that for 
a tax credit in (2). The parameter δ is new and relates the ethanol mandate with the gasoline 
market. Close inspection of equations (2) and (4) reveals that a binding consumption mandate 
is always superior to a blender’s tax credit in terms of the magnitude of market or leakage. 
This is stated by the following proposition.  
Proposition: For the same amount of ethanol, the market leakage (and carbon 
leakage) due to a tax credit is always greater than that due to a consumption mandate. 
Proof: See Drabik, de Gorter and Just (2010). 
 
Market leakage when a tax credit is added to a binding consumption mandate 
If you add a blender’s tax credit to a binding consumption mandate for ethanol, the tax 
credit simply subsidizes gasoline consumption, thus contradicting all environmental 
objectives (de Gorter and Just, 2008; Lapan and Moschini, 2009).
7 Leakage due to the tax 
credit alone in this case is infinity. The explanation is quite intuitive. A tax credit does not 
induce any ethanol production provided that a consumption mandate is binding. It means that 
no gasoline is replaced by ethanol. On the other hand, additional gasoline is consumed 
(displacement) as a result of combining the two policies together. Following the definition of 
market leakage as the ratio of what is displaced and what is replaced, the result is that the 
value of the fraction is infinity. 
However, leakage due to a combination of the two policies will be finite. It is because 
ethanol generated under a mandate does replace some gasoline and so the denominator of the 
fraction is not zero. However, total leakage of the combination of the two policies is higher 
compared to a mandate alone because of the additional oil consumption induced worldwide 
by a tax credit.  
 
5.  A Numerical Example 
 
In this section, we estimate the magnitude of market and carbon leakage for the United States 
using 2009 data.
8 All data are in gasoline equivalents. In 2009, the United States consumed 
22.4 percent and produced 7.4 percent of total world oil consumption.
9 The share of U.S. 
ethanol production represented 1.3 percent of the world gasoline consumption. Baseline 
                                                 
7 For an original account of what happens when adding a tax credit to a blend mandate, see de Gorter and Just 
(2009a). 
8 The sources of the data used are reported in Drabik, de Gorter and Just (2010). 
9 In this paper, we do not distinguish gasoline consumption between transportation and non-transportation use to 




parameters in this paper denote “most plausible” values, based on the sources contained on 
the many other studies to date on the biofuel-fuel markets. The fuel demand elasticity in the 
United States is assumed to be -0.26 and in the Foreign country -0.40. Elasticity of gasoline 
supply in both countries is assumed to be 0.2. The ratio of ethanol and gasoline prices 
adjusted for miles obtained is 1.44. 
Using values of the most plausible market parameters (i.e., “baseline” values), 
estimates of market and carbon leakage are given in Table 1 for three policy options: tax 
credit, consumption mandate and when a tax credit is added to a binding mandate (here we 
use the actual tax credit which does not equal to the price premium due to the mandate). 
Carbon leakage uses two possible values for the relative carbon emissions intensity: with and 
without iLUC. 
 
Table 1: Baseline Values of Market and Carbon Leakages under Trade*
(1) (2) (3)
Market Leakage
    Tax credit 0.65 16% 0.61
    Mandate 0.61 -2% 0.61
    Tax credit w/ binding mandate 0.64 9% 0.61
Carbon Leakage
  Incl. iLUC (ξ=0.21)
    Tax credit 2.09 -24% 1.72
    Mandate 1.90 -56% 1.43
    Tax credit w/ binding mandate 2.07 -36% 1.59
  Excl. iLUC (ξ=0.52)
    Tax credit 0.25 -321% 0.58
    Mandate 0.17 -619% 0.59
    Tax credit w/ binding mandate 0.24 -408% 0.58
Source: calculated
* Magnitudes of leakage multiplied by 100 are interpreted as percentage.
** The values are calculated as ξ minus total market leakage. For example, the value -0.43
indicates that one gasoline-equivalent gallon of ethanol emits 1.43 times more carbon emissions than one gallon of gasoline.
Baseline parameters: ρ=0.224, φ=0.074, δ=1.440, ηDH=-0.26, ηDF=-0.40, ηSH=0.20, ηSF=0.20
Domestic share figures are calculated as follows: 
   For market leakage: change in domestic fuel consumption is divided by change in world fuel consumption (all multiplied by 100).
   For carbon leakage: the numerator of the ratio is equal to carbon intensity of ethanol (relative to gasoline) times quantity 
     of ethanol plus change in domestic gasoline consumption; the denominator is equal to carbon intensity of ethanol times quantity 




















The first column of Table 1 presents total leakage with international trade while the 
second column gives the domestic share. The share of domestic market leakage is the ratio of 
the change in Home country’s fuel consumption to the global change in fuel use (the latter 
represents market leakage in absolute terms).
10 All ethanol is assumed to be consumed 
domestically. Total leakage with a tax credit is 0.65 (i.e., 65 percent) while the share of 
domestic leakage is only 16 percent. Because the United States is one of the biggest 
consumers and importers of oil in the world, results in Table 1 suggest that the domestic 
share is lower in countries like Canada.  
With a mandate, on the other hand, domestic leakage is negative (total fuel 
                                                 
10 We assume that all ethanol is consumed domestically which simplifies the accounting of carbon emissions 
when quantifying carbon leakage. 9 
 
consumption declines) but domestic leakage is low while total leakage is 61 percent. Total 
leakage with a mandate does not differ much from that due to a tax credit because the level of 
domestic leakage is low relative to international leakage, the latter always being  positive. 
This result occurs even with the United States consuming close to one quarter of total world 
oil consumption.  
The third row in Table 1 shows the market leakage when the tax credit is added to a 
binding mandate and total leakage is close to that with a consumption mandate alone. This is 
because after the tax credit is added, the fuel supply curve does not shift down by the full tax 
credit, but only approximately by the share of ethanol multiplied by the tax credit. 
The bottom set of results in Table 1 gives carbon leakage under two scenarios: with 
iLUC using the EPA’s most recent estimate (where corn based ethanol emits 21 percent less 
CO2 relative to gasoline) and without iLUC (where ethanol emits 52 percent less CO2 
compared to gasoline). Unlike market leakage, total carbon leakage when including iLUC (or 
equivalently, if one assumes a direct life-cycle accounting measure of 20 percent as all 
studies on biofuels have to date because the revised EPA estimates in 2010 are very recent 
and have not been incorporated in studies yet) is much higher for all three policy scenarios. 
This is because carbon leakage is a compound measure consisting of two mutually 
synergizing sources through which a policy generates leakage: the market leakage effect, i.e., 
via changes in physical quantities of fuel consumed; and the emissions savings effect where 
gasoline  is being replaced by a biofuel with lower carbon emissions.  
For example, market leakage for a tax credit is 65 percent while carbon leakage is 209 
percent when carbon emissions due to iLUC are taken into account. Carbon leakage is so 
much higher in this case because the carbon savings of 21 percent per gallon of ethanol 
relative to gasoline are more than offset by a world-wide carbon increase due to higher fuel 
consumption. This means that ethanol doubles carbon emissions, for given parameters and an 
intended absolute reduction in carbon emissions. 
On the other hand, total carbon leakage is much lower than market leakage when 
evaluating the former excluding iLUC, using the most up to date EPA estimates of direct life-
cycle accounting (for new plants using specific technologies and inputs e.g., natural gas).
11 
However, looking at the last set of results in the first column of Table 1, carbon leakage is 
much lower than market leakage when excluding iLUC. This differential effect can be 
explained by much stronger carbon emissions savings (52 vs 21 percent) of ethanol that now 
alleviates the generation of carbon through higher fuel consumption more significantly 
relative to the previous case where iLUC was not included as emissions savings. 
Another unique feature of the results in Table 1 is comparing the domestic share of 
carbon leakage with that of market leakage. The importance of domestic carbon leakage is 
more pronounced and much more so when excluding iLUC. The intuition for why domestic 
carbon leakage, for given parameters, is negative and very high in absolute terms (especially 
when ξ is high) is as follows. Domestic gasoline consumption declines, regardless if a tax 
credit or a mandate, thereby significantly lowering domestic carbon emissions. These 
emissions increase again as ethanol replaces the decline in gasoline consumption but the 
replaced amount of emissions is lower than before because ethanol has lower emissions 
relative to gasoline (the more so as ξ increases).  
We have shown in equation (1) that a higher emissions savings parameter for ethanol 
alleviates total carbon leakage. In the previous paragraph, we also explained why higher 
emissions savings with ethanol reduces domestic carbon emissions. Therefore, a higher value 
                                                 
11 One can view the results thus: when including iLUC, the results can also double for a what if you assumed 
direct life-cycle accounting emissions of 20 percent less than gasoline as all studies to date (and before the 
recent EPA ruling for RFS2) while the other results that include iLUC and the new EPA estimate of direct 
emissions are a unique situation itself. 10 
 
of ξ increases domestic carbon savings (the numerator) and at the same time reduces total 
carbon leakage (the denominator), making the domestic share of carbon leakage much bigger 
(in absolute terms). Notice that total carbon leakage is nowhere negative in Table 1 and is 
small for ξ = 0.52. This is because international carbon leakage, albeit being very high, is 
offset by negative domestic leakage, resulting in total leakage (i.e., the sum of domestic and 
international leakage) reported in the bottom section of Table 1.  
In the third column of Table 1, we report the magnitudes of leakage computed 
following the IPCC definition. We have obtained very similar values for market leakage 
because domestic (market) leakage, the difference between ours and the IPCC definition, is 
not significant in the empirical case we study here. However, the emissions savings effect 
renders domestic carbon leakage negative and significant in value (as explained in the 
previous paragraphs) and so the importance of domestic carbon leakage increases, making the 
difference between our definition of leakage and that of the IPCC to widen.  
Finally, in the fourth column of Table 1, we present the “true carbon savings” of 
ethanol relative to gasoline, when the effect of iOUC is included for the case of international 
trade. These values were calculated by taking the difference between the emissions savings 
effect including (or excluding) iLUC and the magnitude of market leakage. The negative sign 
of the difference in all instances suggests that after taking into consideration the market 
leakage effect, corn-ethanol emits more carbon emissions than gasoline. For example, the 
value of -0.43 in the fourth column means that one (gasoline-equivalent) gallon of ethanol 
emits 1.43 times more carbon than one gallon of gasoline.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In analyzing carbon leakage due to alternative biofuel policies, we identify two components: 
the market leakage effect and the emissions savings effect. Market leakage results from a 
change in market prices and a subsequent displacement of gasoline and other oil uses by 
biofuels, while the emissions savings effect represents the relative emissions of biofuels 
versus gasoline. We find that a positive market leakage does not necessarily imply a positive 
carbon leakage but a negative market leakage (that may occur with a mandate) always 
implies a negative carbon leakage. 
The international trade framework within which we analyze a blender’s tax credit and 
a consumption mandate gives rise to a distinction between domestic and international 
leakage. Domestic leakage can be significant theoretically under plausible market situations 
but is found empirically to be relative small in the case of U.S. biofuels policy. Because 
world gasoline prices decline with either biofuel policy, international leakage is always 
positive, as is domestic leakage with a tax credit. But domestic leakage with a mandate can be 
negative, making it theoretically possible that total (domestic plus international) leakage can 
be negative.  
We show that market leakages (and hence carbon leakage) with both biofuel policies 
depend on two groups of parameters: (1) the elasticities of gasoline supply curves and fuel 
demand curves; and (2) consumption and production shares of the country introducing the 
biofuels. Leakage is typically more sensitive to elasticities than to market shares, and is 
especially more sensitive to changes in market parameters of the country not introducing 
biofuels.  
Our numerical estimates for the United States in 2009 reveal market leakage to be 
between 60 and 65 percent for all three policy options (i.e., tax credit, a mandate, and their 
combination). This narrow range suggests the benefit of a mandate over a tax credit in 
reducing total carbon leakage is not so important empirically in the case of the United States. 
Our empirical results indicate that carbon leakage ranges between 190 to 210 percent 11 
 
provided iLUC is taken into account and it ranges from 20 to 25 percent when excluding 
iLUC. We find that existing indirect output changes (i.e., market leakage) reduce the ability 
of ethanol to save carbon emissions relative to gasoline and the empirical results for the U.S. 
policies result in ethanol emitting more carbon than gasoline – between 1.09 to 1.44 times 




Al-Riffai, P., B.Dimaranan, and D. Laborde. (2010). “Global Trade and Environmental 
Impact Study of the EU Biofuels Mandate”. Final report of an external study for the 
European Commission carried out by CEPII and IFPRI, March 2010. 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/studies/doc/land_use_change/iluc_completed_r
eport.pdf  
de Gorter, H. (2009). “Integrating Developing Country Agriculture into Global Climate 
Change Mitigation Efforts.” In Non-Distorting Farm Support to Enhance Global 
Food Production, eds. Aziz Elbehri and Alexander Sarris. Rome, Italy: Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
de Gorter, H, and D.R. Just (2008). “The Economics of the U.S. Ethanol Consumption 
Mandate and Tax Credit.” Department of Applied Economics and Management 
Working Paper unpublished, Cornell University, 17 April (prepared for seminar at 
Cornell 1 May 2008) (paper available upon request).  
______. (2009a). “The Economics of a Blend Mandate for Biofuels”. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 91 (3): 738-750. 
———. (2009b). “Why Sustainability Standards for Biofuel Production Make Little  
Economic Sense”. Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 647, Washington D.C. 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa647.pdf  
Drabik, D., and H. de Gorter. (2010). “Biofuels and Leakages in the Fuel Market”. A selected 
paper presented at International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium: Climate 
Change in World Agriculture: Mitigation, Adaptation, Trade and Food Security, June 
2010, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany. https://iatrc2010.uni-
hohenheim.de/fileadmin/einrichtungen/iatrc2010/Papers/deGorter_et_al._IATRC_Su
mmer_2010.pdf 
Drabik, D., de Gorter, H., and Just, D.R. (2010). “The Implications of Alternative Biofuel 
Policies on Carbon Leakage”. Working Paper 2010-22. Charles H. Dyson School of 
Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University. November 2010 (updated 
December 2010). http://aem.cornell.edu/research/researchpdf/wp/2010/Cornell-
Dyson-wp1022.pdf 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (2010). “Renewable Fuel Standard Program 
 (RFS2) Regulatory Impact Analysis”. EPA-420-R-10-006, February 2010 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). “Glossary of Terms used in the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report.” http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/ar4-wg3.pdf 
Lapan, H., and G. Moschini. (2009). “Biofuel Policies and Welfare: Is the Stick of Mandates 
Better than the Carrot of Subsidies?” Working Paper No. 09010, Department of 
Economics, Iowa State University, June Ames, Iowa. 
Renewable Fuels Association (RFA). 2010. “RFS Rules "Workable" - ILUC Inclusion Still 
Problematic”. Press Release, February 3.  
http://renewablefuelsassociation.cmail1.com/T/ViewEmail/y/78B3C6C380747C63 
Searchinger, T., R. Heimlich, R. Houghton, F. Dong, A. Elobeid, J. Fabiosa, S. Tokgoz, D. 
Hayes, and T. Yu. (2008). “Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse 
Gases through Emissions from Land Use Change.” Science 319 (5867): 1238-1240. 12 
 










SH'                    
E























CH0 E QH0 QT1 CH1 QF1 QF0 CF0 CF1
Figure 2: Biofuels Leakage with a Consumption Mandate and Trade
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